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Soft Power
Joseph Nye stated that “soft power,” in his quintessential book by the same
name, is attractive power. That is, soft power cannot and does not try to force certain
behaviors through coercion or inducement. Instead, it attracts others to the values,
culture, and policies of a regime and engenders cooperation with that regime’s
agenda (Nye 2004, 6-9). Soft power can be measured through various methods such
as public opinion polling or observing the language governments and civilians use
to discuss the nation in question. If there is an attraction to that country’s values
and agenda, the effectiveness of its soft power can be measured on a case-by-case
basis according to the policy actions taken by the attracted government as a result.
According to Nye, there are three broadly defined categories of soft power
sources: culture, values, and policy. Though a great deal of overlap exists between
the three categories, together they cover the breadth of the sources of attraction a
nation and government might possess. Culture deals with the norms and customs
of daily life in a country and the image it projects of itself through media and
commerce. Values are defined as the relational and moral ideals common
throughout society and demonstrated through actions by the general populace and
its government. Policy entails the actions and plans laid out by a government.
Specifically, Nye uses this category to measure whether or not the goals and ideals
represented by those policies are attractive to other countries and make them want
to be a partner in those policies (Nye 2004, 9).
The importance attributed to these sources of soft power rests upon a crucial
assumption: soft power is real. Nye’s theory of soft power runs counter to
traditional ideas about power as the ability to influence others to do what one wants
them to do, either by the threat of punishment or the possibility of reward. It is
reasonable, then, to question whether soft power is a real source of international
power and if attraction to a country’s culture, values, and policies can induce other
countries to act favorably towards that nation out of pure benevolence. This paper
aims to put these questions on the legitimacy of soft power to the test by examining
the relative soft power of two comparable countries. It will first determine if they
have developed a degree of attraction to their culture, values, and policies and then
whether or not that attraction has translated into real soft power by getting other
countries to act favorably as a result.
Israel and Saudi Arabia are actively engaged in generating attraction from
the United States government and its people. The overlap of their policy goals, due
in part to regional proximity, makes it possible to measure and compare the degree
to which that attraction has developed into meaningful soft power by producing
desired policy outcomes from the US. Comparing the countries’ policy outcomes,
as measured against their respective levels of soft power, will provide valuable

insight into the accuracy and applicability of Nye’s theory of soft power. This
technique is not a precise science as it relies on subjective interpretation of the
degrees of attraction each country has produced and to what extent US foreign
policy aligns with the agendas of each country. Nevertheless, a reasonable attempt
at objective comparison will be made that should provide unique insights into the
question of soft power effectiveness and implications for how Israel and Saudi
Arabia should proceed if they wish to improve their soft power influence on the
United States.
The State of Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were chosen for this
analysis because of their regional proximity, parallels in US relations, and the
unique relationship between the two countries that pits them as culturally
adversarial despite sharing many similar foreign policy desires. Israel and Saudi
Arabia have a tense historical relationship. Saudi Arabia supplied troops to support
the invasion of Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and has since refused to
normalize relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia has stated that relations will not
improve until a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is reached that includes
a Palestinian state with pre-1967 territorial boundaries (AFP 2021). Despite this
conflict, Israel and Saudi Arabia’s interests in regional security have been naturally
brought together via their shared archrival, Iran. Iran’s proxy fighters throughout
the Middle East and its ambition to obtain nuclear warheads threaten both the
security and stability of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the region. Furthermore, both
nations have gone to great lengths to bolster their relationship with the United
States, which acts as a critical military and economic force against any advances
made by the Iranian regime.
In building their relationships with the United States, Israel and Saudi
Arabia have employed different sets of potential soft power assets to win the favor
of the American people and, subsequently, US foreign policy decisions that favor
their respective and shared interests in the Middle East. This paper will compare
and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of both countries in the three categories
of soft power: culture, values, and policy. After this analysis, it will discuss how
these soft power qualities affected the policy priorities and actions of former US
President Donald Trump and why the country with superior soft power was able to
win more favor in terms of US policy response. Then, it will consider if that soft
power can transfer to the new administration under President Joe Biden, who
frequently contrasts himself with his predecessor, or if the shifting policy priorities
between administrations limit the longevity of soft power. Finally, it will consider
the implications of this analysis for the ongoing relationship between these three
countries and what different outcomes in those relationships and accompanying
policies mean for the future study of soft power.
Culture

The first major consideration of soft power is whether or not a country’s
culture is attractive to the nation it hopes to influence. Although cultural differences
are typically considered subjective, there are some reasonably objective ways to
measure how others perceive that culture. For example, we can look at existing
public opinion polls taken in America that indicate the favorability of Saudi Arabia
and Israel by the American populace. We can also see if dollars and feet follow
those opinions by estimating how many Americans visit these countries each year
and how much business they do with them.
To gain an immediate sense of Americans’ overall views of each country,
we can examine recent polling taken by Gallup and YouGov. Gallup surveys
Americans’ favorability of about twenty to thirty countries each year by asking
them to say whether their opinion of a country is “very/mostly favorable” or
“very/mostly unfavorable.” Israel has placed well in this survey over the past few
years, with a mostly or very favorable rating of 71%, 74%, and 74% in 2017, 2018,
and 2020, respectively (Newport 2017; Brenan 2018; McCarthy 2020). According
to Gallup polling, a nearly three-fourths positive view of Israel held steady over
Donald Trump’s presidency, which placed it just within the top ten (approximately
the top half) of the selected groups of countries polled. By comparison, Saudi
Arabia ranked in the lower half each year, receiving “mostly” or “very favorable”
scores from 31%, 41%, and 34% in 2017, 2018, and 2020, respectively (Newport
2017; Brenan 2018; McCarthy 2020).
Although informative, these Gallup surveys do not provide a complete
picture of Americans’ favorability of these two countries as they only surveyed up
to two dozen countries. In 2020, YouGov conducted a similar survey that attempted
to tabulate Americans’ views of 195 different countries around the globe and rank
them accordingly. In their study, which calculated the percent of Americans with
“a positive view of each country,” the favorability of each country appears to be
down substantially (around 20+ points), but this also seems to be the case even for
Americans’ most favorable countries like Canada, suggesting the difference may
be caused by different polling practices or skewed sampling. For the purposes of
this analysis, though, we are only interested in the relative favorability between
Israel and Saudi Arabia.
YouGov ranked Israel as the twenty-fifth most popular country, with 54%
of Americans having a favorable opinion of the nation (YouGov 2020a). Saudi
Arabia ranked far lower as the 141st most popular country, with a mere 19% of
Americans saying they have a favorable view of the nation (YouGov 2020b).
YouGov also includes the percent of Americans with a negative view of Israel and
Saudi Arabia, which stand at 16% and 48%, respectively (Smith 2020). An
additional insight of particular interest in the YouGov data was whether political
differences in the United States affected the favorability of a country. Israel had the

most significant difference in favorability between Republicans and Democrats in
the United States. It was also one of only two countries that Republicans gave a
significantly higher favorability rating (the other was the USA, which 95% of
Republicans had a favorable view of compared to 68% of Democrats). 69% of
Republicans had a favorable view of Israel compared to 36% of Democrats,
suggesting that internal US political differences correlate with differing opinions
on the State of Israel. This was not the case for Saudi Arabia, which was viewed
positively by 17% of Democrats surveyed and 16% of Republicans (Smith 2020).
Altogether, this data reveals that Americans have much more positive views
of Israel than Saudi Arabia. Americans are split politically on Israel, with the
majority of Republicans viewing the country favorably compared to a minority of
Democrats. This suggests that Israel may have a ceiling on its ability to curry favor
with Americans so long as Israel’s stances on contentious issues like that of
Palestinian sovereignty divide Americans. Nevertheless, the Gallup data
demonstrate greater overall support for Israel. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand,
appears to be widely disliked by the breadth of Americans in both surveys.
These favorability ratings appear to correlate with other markers of cultural
impact by Israel and Saudi Arabia. According to Statista, the number of Americans
visiting Saudi Arabia is declining year-over-year, with the peak of 291,408
American travelers to Saudi Arabia in 2015 dipping down to a low of 159,597 in
2019 (2020 excluded due to COVID-19 travel restrictions) (Lock 2022b). Saudi
Arabia sent a similar 160,000 visitors to the US in 2019. Israel’s number of US
visitors steadily increased over the same period, with the same caveat for 2020.
Israel received 408,836 American visitors in 2015 and was up to 450,572 in 2019
(Lock 2022a). Israel also sent a similar 450,000 Israeli visitors to the US in 2019.
Israel received nearly three times as many visitors from the United States as Saudi
Arabia did in 2019. This is particularly significant given the relative populations of
these countries, with Saudi Arabia receiving a third as many visitors despite tripling
Israel in size with its 34 million people compared to Israel’s 9 million.
Continuing this trend, Israel has also managed to beat out Saudi Arabia in
economic terms, despite the drastic difference in population size. In total, Israel’s
economic trade with the United States in 2019 topped $47 billion, surpassing Saudi
Arabia’s $38.7 billion (Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
2020a, USTR 2020b). The complete picture of trade and soft power skews even
more heavily in Israel’s favor. Israel managed a net export surplus of $6.7 billion
with the United States compared to Saudi Arabia’s $9.0 billion trade deficit. In
summary, Israel is doing more business with the United States than Saudi Arabia,
despite having one-third of the population size and half the total GDP, and is also
managing to sell more goods and services to Americans than it receives.
This means the majority of commerce between Israel and the United States
involves Israeli products and cultural influence going to America, where it can

further impact Americans’ view of Israel as they consume its products. This is a
significant advantage when building soft power as it allows a nation’s economy to
naturally influence the other country beyond what the government’s policies can
do alone. Unlike Israel, oil makes up more than 90% of Saudi Arabia’s goods
exported to the US. While fuel costs are a politically significant issue, it seems
unlikely that individual Americans will know where the gas put in their car is
coming from, making oil a relatively low impact export good on soft power
formation. Israel, in comparison, sells a much more diverse range of products to the
United States (USTR 2020a).
By these metrics, Israel’s cultural influence on the United States dominates
that of Saudi Arabia. Israel bests Saudi Arabia, a larger country by size and
population, in terms of goods and people exchanged between itself and the United
States annually. Trading products and exposing citizens to each other’s country is
vital for gaining soft power with a specific country. Future studies into this issue
could look at breaking these metrics down further to understand who is coming and
going from each country (e.g., businesspeople, tourists, exchange students) and to
what extent the country is exporting the most influential goods and services (e.g.,
film, music, and cultural food).
Values
A nation’s values can be written or unwritten, institutional or cultural, held
in high esteem or left unspoken. This makes it more difficult, and certainly more
subjective, to evaluate the influence of a nation’s values than its culture as statistical
metrics are less available and less reliable. Still, knowing the relative favorability
of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the United States can provide a basis for estimating
how Americans perceive these countries’ values. It also points to some of the key
differences between how Americans are attracted to or repelled by the values
espoused and demonstrated by Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The first apparent issue, and likely one of the major deciding factors for
Americans, is that Israel is a parliamentary democracy, and Saudi Arabia is a
hereditary monarchy. Although not parliamentary, the history of the United States’
attraction to and promotion of democracy abroad is long and storied. So too is the
aversion Americans have towards authoritarian governments and monarchies.
Further compounding this negative view of Saudi values is the restrictive,
oppressive nature of the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia has been widely criticized for systematically suppressing
dissent within the country, including jailing activists for long periods for criticizing
government practices (Human Rights Watch 2021b). It does not tolerate public
worship of faiths outside its primary Islamic views and openly discriminates against
religious minorities and those engaging in sexual practices deemed to be contrary

to Islamic Law. International criticism of the Saudi government intensified as a
result of its role in the execution of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 (BBC News
2021). Israel, in contrast, boasts religious freedom for its religious minorities,
including Christians, Muslims, and Druze, to publicly worship according to their
traditions. The LGBTQ community receives open approval from the Israeli
government, as demonstrated by the annual international “Pride” parade, which
garnered a quarter-million attendees in 2019, the largest of its kind anywhere in the
Middle East (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019).
Despite the stark difference in the relative openness of the two countries,
critics of Israel argue that the nation’s claims of freedom and opportunity do not
extend to everyone, depending on where they live. Over 4.5 million Palestinians
live in the West Bank territory and Gaza Strip where governance is split between
partial autonomous rule and partial Israeli military and civilian rule. Palestinians
seek full autonomy, but disagreements with the Israeli government over issues like
control of East Jerusalem have prevented a final “two-state” solution from ever
being implemented, despite multiple proposals over decades. Human rights
organizations have criticized Israel for the living conditions inside Palestine and the
implementation of strict travel and import/export bans on Palestinians living in
Gaza (Human Rights Watch 2021a).
What some call an illegal occupation constituting human rights abuses,
Israel contends is a necessary precaution taken for the self-defense and preservation
of its citizens who are targeted by Hamas extremists in both the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Herein lies the political split in the United States over Israel’s
favorability (compared to the politically universal negative views of Saudi Arabia).
Although Israel enjoys majority support from Americans, it is not evenly
distributed. Republicans widely maintain positive views of Israel, whereas the
majority of Democrats do not, and the dividing issue appears to be questions over
the rights of Palestinians. A 2018 Pew Research poll showed that Republicans and
Democrats are more divided on the Issue of Palestine than ever before. Both parties
were roughly equally sympathetic to Israel and Palestine in 1978. Republican
sympathy with Israel on the matter has grown to 79%, and Democrat sympathy has
fallen to only 27% (Pew Research Center 2018).
Given this information, it seems that Americans generally view Saudi
Arabia unfavorably on account of its expressed values. In contrast, they are largely
favorable towards Israel, with a strong exception from many left-leaning
Americans who view Israel’s role in the Palestinian conflict negatively. As it is
unlikely that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will be relinquishing power
anytime soon, Saudi Arabia’s only opportunity to improve its soft power in the US
from a values standpoint is to improve its human rights record and its treatment of
minorities in its country.

For Israel, having captured substantial support from those who take its side
in the Palestinian conflict, the only potential room for growth lies in finding a
solution to the issue of Palestinian sovereignty acceptable to the American political
left. Of course, such a solution will continue to evade them, despite attempts made
alongside the Trump administration as recent as 2020, so long as the two sides
maintain irreconcilable differences over what they want from the two-state deal.
Alternatively, it is possible, though unlikely, that Israel could persuade its
detractors over time that it has upheld its end by proposing multiple solutions,
which have all been rejected by Palestinian leadership without any serious dialogue.
Policy
Policy is Nye’s third and final soft power metric to be considered. The way
a nation conducts its foreign policy, and the agenda it publicly pursues, affects how
citizens of other countries view the morality and legitimacy of a nation. There is a
remarkable similarity between views on Israel and Saudi Arabia in this instance.
Both are military allies to the United States in the region, and all three nations’
governments view the Iranian regime as a common adversary. In general, both
nations benefit from Americans’ animosity toward Iran. In recent polls, Iran is
frequently the most disliked country by Americans, competing only with North
Korea for the bottom spot (McCarthy 2020).
Looking specifically at the question of Iran’s quest to be a nuclear power,
Americans’ perceptions are particularly unfavorable. In 2013, Pew Research
showed that the majority of Americans supported the use of military force to
prevent Iran from acquiring weapons (64%), and the vast majority (93%) opposed
Iran developing nuclear weapons (Stokes 2013). The same questions were also
posed to Israeli citizens due to Israel’s stated “Begin Doctrine” that calls for
preemptive strikes against nuclear capabilities possessed by adversaries. In the poll,
Israeli citizens answered almost identically to Americans to the prior two questions
(68% and 96%, respectively). However, they were much more concerned about the
threat of Iran’s nuclear program (85%) than Americans (54%) (Stokes 2013).
Additionally, a minority of Americans held negative views of Iran (42%) compared
to the majority of Israelis (75%) (Stokes 2013).
While Americans share a similar, though not as dire, view of Iran’s nuclear
threat, that does not mean every action taken by Israel against Iran will be seen
positively. Recent incidents in the past few years, including the assassination of
Iran’s top nuclear scientist, have drawn both admiration and sharp criticism within
the United States. While Americans adamantly oppose Iran obtaining nuclear
weapons, doing so through diplomatic agreements rather than executions is likely
more palatable to those who do not share the same sense of urgency as Israeli
citizens.

Saudi Arabia faces complex foreign policy challenges of its own, including
a unique aspect of the regional power struggle with Iran. Saudi Arabia leads a multination coalition backing the Yemeni government in a brutal internal war against
Iran-backed Houthi rebels. According to monitoring by the United Nations, more
than 230,000 deaths in Yemen have been attributed to the war (United Nations
2020). As the war continues to rage on and reports of severe human rights abuses
pour in, support has waned globally. In the United States, citizens polled in 2018
by YouGov showed that of those with an opinion on the war in Yemen (many were
unaware of the war altogether), 75% opposed future US weapons sales to Saudi
Arabia and wanted to see the United States withdraw its support for the war.
Though uneven, there was bipartisan support for this position as 89% of liberals
and 54% of conservatives surveyed opposed continued arms sales, and 98% of
liberals and 63% of conservatives supported withdrawing US support to the Saudi
coalition (International Rescue Committee 2018).
In each issue affecting Israel and Saudi Arabia, there is strong American
sentiment against Iran and its influence throughout the region. Yet, that anti-Iran
sentiment does not perfectly translate into pro-Israeli or Saudi support. There is
hesitancy to support violent covert operations by Israel against Iran’s nuclear
program and an even more decisive rejection of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen,
regardless of Iran’s involvement. This may not seem entirely rational or consistent
as a matter of foreign policy, but because soft power is largely influenced by public
perception, the target nation’s public opinions ultimately decide what is considered
just or unjust.
Payoff
Up to this point, the only results of Israel and Saudi Arabia’s soft power in
America that have been discussed are public perception and favorability. It has been
shown that Israel possesses a far greater level of public attraction in the US than
Saudi Arabia on account of differences in culture and values. However, Israel has
failed to maximize either of these categories due to a contingency of Americans
who have a negative view of Israel due to Israel’s actions in the longstanding
Palestinian conflict. While both countries are favored over Iran in the region due to
Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, support is split when it comes to direct violent
conflict.
Although both nations were able to translate their soft power into policy
successes during the Trump administration, they face a sharp decline in foreign
policy support from the Biden administration. This will appear starker for Israel as
attempts are made to arrange a new nuclear deal between Iran and the US, but that
decline should not be mistaken for abandonment. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia’s
already low American support will dip a little lower, but Israel’s support from the

United States and the current administration will remain comparatively very high,
giving Israel a decisive edge over Saudi Arabia in the region.
Throughout the Trump administration, Israel enjoyed some of the highest
levels of access and policy success it has ever seen from the United States. President
Trump fulfilled the long-awaited promise to move the United States’ Israeli
Embassy to Jerusalem and he also removed the United States from the JCPOA
nuclear agreement with Iran. In addition to these major policy wins for Israel, the
Trump administration helped broker the historic Abraham Accords, which
established normalized relations between Israel and former adversaries in the
region, most notably the United Arab Emirates. These peace deals were achieved
without requiring Israel to acquiesce to a version of the two-state solution with
Palestine that had thus far never been seen as acceptable to Israel. This all occurred
contrary to the wishes of Saudi Arabia, who to this day states they will not
normalize relations with Israel until their favored two-state solution has been
implemented. However, they have publicly stated they hope to see this
normalization occur. There is evidence of secret meetings held between their
respective heads of state, potentially discussing this and Iranian issues (AFP 2021).
Although the Trump administration placed pressure on this Saudi position
through the Abraham Accords, demonstrating Israel’s favorability over Saudi
Arabia when the two were in conflict, the Trump administration did continue to
vigorously support the Saudi coalition in Yemen through arms sales, despite
misgivings about the war by many Americans. In short, both countries were able to
leverage their respective soft power to induce American assistance on issues that
are primarily important to the immediate needs and interests of Israel and Saudi
Arabia rather than the United States itself. Between the two, Israel came out on top.
What remains to be seen now is what degree of soft power these two
countries will retain with the Democratic Biden administration and to what degree
it can be leveraged. The Democratic base that elected President Biden has far more
negative feelings towards Israel and Saudi Arabia on account of issues in Palestine
and Yemen than did the previous Republican base under President Trump. To the
chagrin of both nations, the Biden administration is seeking to rejoin an agreement
with Iran similar to the 2015 JCPOA that will lift severe economic sanctions placed
on the Iranian regime in return for certain limitations on Iran’s nuclear program.
The Biden administration believes this will be a better way to manage Iran and
prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon than the status quo.
Although Israel has expressed its extreme displeasure at this development,
and talks between Israel and the United States about the details of the potential new
agreement are underway, this is not an indication that the United States no longer
values Israel as a critical ally (Magid 2021b). On the contrary, US Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in
Jerusalem to express the United States’ “ironclad” enduring commitment to Israel

and its security in the region (Garamone 2021). Netanyahu expressed that he finds
comfort in the shared values and beliefs between the two countries, and remarked
that he admired Secretary Austin’s private comments suggesting that the United
States and Israel are closer than allies, they are “family” (United States Department
of Defense 2021).
Endearing language aside, the United States and Israel are nevertheless at
odds over the Iran nuclear deal. Outside of these remarks, Israel has stated that it
will not be bound by the international agreement, in which it is not a participant.
Israel’s Ambassador to the US said that Israel reserves its right to defend itself from
any imminent Iranian threats (TOI Staff 2021).
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, finds itself in deeper water with the United
States. In addition to the US negotiations with Iran, President Biden has withdrawn
all US support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen (Knickmeyer 2021). Left without
its strongest partner and facing a potentially sanction-free Iran, Saudi Arabia
initiated the previously unthinkable and entered into negotiations with Iran to end
the war in Yemen. Though the initial talks failed to resolve the conflict, they
marked the first time the two countries had held any diplomatic relations since
2016, further demonstrating how desperate the situation appears to be for Saudi
Arabia (Hasan 2021). It remains possible, though unclear, if the US will insist that
Iran makes concessions as a part of the new nuclear deal in a show of indirect
support for Saudi Arabia.
Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Biden administration appear stable
but diminished. In an attempt to appear positive, the Crown Prince stated that Saudi
Arabia and the Biden administration agree on “90% of issues of mutual concern,”
but disagree on the unspecified remaining 10% (ILH Staff and AP 2021). President
Biden, in contrast, stated that “things are going to change” in the US relationship
with Saudi Arabia, and the US State Department has said that they will only assist
Saudi’s interest in normalizing ties with Israel and achieving peace in Yemen if
they correct their human rights record (Magid 2021a). Under the Biden
administration, Israel’s soft power appears secure, albeit weakened. Saudi Arabia’s
soft power may just be running out.
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